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ABSTRACT
Drossopoulou and Noble [6] argue persuasively for the
need for a means to express policy in object-capability-
based systems. We investigate a practical means to re-
alize their aim via the Curry-Howard isomorphism [1]
[13]. Specifically, we investigate representing policy as
types in a behavioral type system for the rho-calculus
[15], a reflective higher-order variant of the π-calculus
[18].
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1. INTRODUCTION
The object-capability (ocap) security model grew out
of the realization that good object-oriented program-
ming practice leads to good security properties. Sepa-
ration of duties leads to separation of authority; infor-
mation hiding leads to integrity; message passing leads
to authorization; and dependency injection to author-
ity injection. An ocap-secure programming language
enforces these patterns: the only way an object can
modify any state but its own is by sending messages
on the object references it possesses. Authority can
then be denied simply by not providing the relevant
object reference. Ocap languages do not provide ambi-
ent, undeniable authority such as the global variables
in JavaScript, static mutable fields in Java and C#,
or allowing access to arbitrary objects through pointer
arithmetic as in C and C++.
The electronic society is moving steadily towards the
object capability model. ECMAScript 5, the standard
version of JavaScript adopted by all modern browsers,
introduced a new security API that enables the web
browser to be turned into an ocap-safe platform; Google’s
Caja project is an implementation [11]. Brendan Eich,
CTO of Mozilla, wrote, “In SpiderMonkey + Gecko
in Firefox, and probably in other browsers, we actu-
ally use OCap under the hood and have for years. In
HTML5, the WindowProxy/Window distinction was
finally specified, as an ad-hoc instance of OCap mem-
branes. Any time we deviate from OCap, we regret
it for both security bug and access-checking overhead
reasons.” [7]
We would like a way to declare the authority that
an object ought to possess and then check whether
the implementation matches the intent; that is, we
would like a language for declaring security policy.
Drossopoulou and Noble [6] convincingly argue that
none of the current specification methods adequately
capture all of the capability policies required to sup-
port ocap systems. The most intriguing aspect of the
capability policies proposed in [6] is deniability. Deni-
ability differs from usual style of specifications in the
following two aspects: a) it describes policies which
are open, i.e. apply to a module as well as all its
extensions, and b) describes necessary conditions for
some effect to take place. For example, a policy may
require that in order for any piece of code to modify
the balance of a bank account, it needs to have access
to that account (access to the account is a necessary
condition), and that this property is satisfied by all
extensions of the account library (open). In contrast,
classical Hoare Logic specifications [8] describe suffi-
cient conditions and are closed. In this paper we con-
centrate on the use of the rho-calculus [15] 1 for ex-
pressing deniability. To express necessary conditions,
we invert the assertion and use bisimulation (e.g. any
piece of code which does not have access to the ac-
count will be bisimilar to code in which the balance
of the account is not modified). To express openness,
we adapt the concept of the adjoint to the separation
operator, i.e. any further code P which is attached
to the current code will be bisimilar to P in parallel
with code which does not modify the balance of the
account.
In short, we show that the rho-calculus is an ocap
language and sketch a translation from a subset of
JavaScript into the calculus; we also demonstrate that
the corresponding Hennessy-Milner logic suffices to
capture the key notion of deniability.
In the larger scheme, this identifies [6]’s notion of
policy with the proposition-as-types paradigm, also
known as The Curry-Howard isomorphism [1] [13].
1the Reflective H igher-Order calculus, not to be con-
fused with the ρ-calculus [5]
The Curry-Howard isomorphism relates formal logic
to type theory; it says that propositions are to types
as proofs are to programs. Hennessy-Milner logic lets
us treat the type of a concurrent process as an asser-
tion that it belongs to a set of processes, all of which
satisfy some property. We can treat these properties
as contracts governing the behavior of the process [14];
in other words, the language of behavioral types suf-
fices as a security policy language.
1.0.1 Organization of the rest of the paper
We introduce the calculus. So equipped we illustrate
translating a simple ocap example into the calculus.
Next, we introduce the logic, and illustrate how we
can reason about properties of the translated program
and from there move to interpreting policy, focusing
on deniability. Finally, we conclude with a discussion
of some of the limitations of the approach and how we
might approach these in future work.
2. THE CALCULUS
Before giving the formal presentation of the calculus
and logic where we interpret ocap programs and pol-
icy, respectively, we begin with a couple of examples
that illustrate a design pattern used over and over in
this paper. The first is a mutable single-place cell for
storing and retrieving state.
de f Cell(slot, state)⇒ {
new (v) {
v!(state)
match {
slot?get(ret)⇒ {
v?(s)⇒ ret!(s)
Cell(slot, s)
}
slot?set(s)⇒ { Cell(slot, s) }
}
}
}
We read this as saying that a Cell is parametric in
some (initial) state and a slot for accessing and mutat-
ing the cell’s state. A Cell allocates a private channel
v where it makes the initially supplied state available
to its internal computations. If on the channel slot it
receives a get message containing a channel ret indi-
cating where to send the state of the cell, it accesses
the private channel v and sends the value it received
on to the ret channel; then it resumes behaving as a
Cell. Alternatively, if it receives a set message con-
taining some new state s, it simply continues as a Cell
instantiated with accessor slot and state s.
Despite the fact that this example bears a striking
resemblance to code in any of a number of popu-
lar libraries, notably the AKKA library for the Scala
language, it is only a mildly sugared form of the di-
rect representation in our calculus. Notice also that
like modern application code, it exhibits encapsula-
tion and separation of implementation from API: a
cell’s internal access to state is kept in a private chan-
nel v while external access is through slot. Another
nice thing about this design pattern is that it scales
through composition: when translating ocap exam-
ples expressed in ECMAScript to rho-calculus we will
effectively treat the state of an object as a parallel
composition of cells comprising its state.
The second gadget is an immutable map:
def Map(chan, key1, state1, . . . , keyn, staten)⇒ {
new (v1, . . . vn) {
v1!(state1)
. . .
vn!(staten)
chan?get(key1, ret)⇒ {
v1?(x)⇒ ret!(x)
Map(chan, key1, state1, . . . , keyn, staten)
}
. . .
chan?get(keyn, ret)⇒ {
vn?(x)⇒ ret!(x)
Map(chan, key1, state1, . . . , keyn, staten)
}
}
}
The design pattern for maps is related to the one for
cells, but is missing the capability to mutate the map.
The code does not serve a request to set any of the
values it contains. With these two patterns in hand it
will be much easier to treat the examples. Moreover,
as we will see in the sequel, even with these basic pat-
terns we can already reason about policy. The shape of
the reasoning about policy for these examples scales
compositionally to reasoning about application-level
policy.
2.0.2 The rho-calculus
The rho-calculus [16] is a variant of the asynchronous
polyadic π-calculus. When names are polarized [19],
the π-calculus is an ocap language. Pierce and Turner
[20] defined the programming language Pict as sugar
over the polarized π-calculus together with some sup-
porting libraries; unfortunately, the authority provided
by the libraries violated the principle of least author-
ity. Kos˘´ık refactored the libraries to create Tamed
Pict, recovering an ocap language, then used it to
write a defensively consistent operating system [12].
The rho-calculus differs from the π-calculus in that
names are quoted processes rather than generated by
the ν operator. Both freshness and polarization are
provided through the use of namespaces at the type
level.
We let P,Q,R range over processes and x, y, z range
over names, and ~x for sequences of names, |~x| for the
length of ~x, and {~y/~x} as partial maps from names to
names that may be uniquely extended to maps from
processes to processes [16].
M,N ::= 0 stopped process
| x?(y1, . . . , yN )⇒ P input
| x!(Q1, . . . , QN) output
|M+N choice
P,Q ::=M include IO processes
| P |Q parallel
| ∗x dereference
x, y ::= @P reference
The examples from the previous section use mild (and
entirely standard) syntactic sugar: def making re-
cursive definitions a little more convenient than their
higher-order encodings, new making fresh channel al-
location a little more convenient and match for purely
input-guarded choice. Additionally, the examples use
{}-enclosed blocks together with line breaks, rather
than | for parallel composition. Thus the expression
v!(state) is actually a thread running in parallel with
the match expression in the Cell definition. The in-
terested reader is directed to the appendix for more
details.
2.1 Free and bound names
The syntax has been chosen so that a binding occur-
rence of a name is sandwiched between round braces,
( · ). Thus, the calculation of the free names of a pro-
cess, P , denoted FN (P ) is given recursively by
FN (0) := ∅
FN (x?(y1, . . . , yN)⇒ P ) :=
{x} ∪ (FN (P ) \ {y1, . . . yN})
FN (x!(Q1, . . . , QN)) := {x} ∪
⋃
FN (Qi)
FN (P |Q) := FN (P ) ∪ FN (Q)
FN (∗x) x := {x}
An occurrence of x in a process P is bound if it is not
free. The set of names occurring in a process (bound
or free) is denoted by N (P ).
2.2 Structural congruence
The structural congruence of processes, noted ≡, is the
least congruence containing α-equivalence, ≡α, that
satisfies the following laws:
P | 0 ≡ P ≡ 0 | P
P |Q ≡ Q | P
(P |Q) |R ≡ P | (Q |R)
Name equivalence. As discussed in [15] the calculus
uses an equality, ≡N , pronounced name-equivalence,
recursively related to α-equivalence and structural equiv-
alence, to judge when two names are equivalent, when
deciding synchronization and substitution.
2.3 Semantic substitution
The engine of computation in this calculus is the inter-
action between synchronization and a form of substi-
tution, called semantic substitution. Semantic substi-
tution differs from ordinary syntactic substitution in
its application to a dropped name. For more details
see [16]
(∗x) ̂{@Q/@P} :=
{
Q x≡N @P
∗x otherwise
Finally equipped with these standard features we can
present the dynamics of the calculus.
2.4 Operational Semantics
The reduction rules for rho-calculus are
x0 ≡N x1, |~y| = | ~Q|
x0?(~y)⇒ P | x1!(~Q)→ P{@ ~Q/~y}
(Comm)
In addition, we have the following context rules:
P → P ′
P |Q→ P ′ |Q
(Par)
P ≡ P ′ P ′ → Q′ Q′ ≡Q
P → Q
(Equiv)
The context rules are entirely standard and we do not
say much about them here. The communication rule
makes it possible for agents to synchronize at name-
equivalent guards and communicate processes pack-
aged as names. Here is a simple example of the use
of synchronization, reduction and quasiquote: x(z)⇒
w!(y!(∗z)) | x!(P ) → w!(y!(P )). The input-guarded
process, x(z) ⇒ w!(y!(∗z)), waits to receive the code
of P from the output-guarded data, x!(P ), and then
reduces to a new process the body of which is rewrit-
ten to include P , w!(y!(P )).
Bisimulation. One of the central features of process
calculi, referred to in the literature as bisimulation, is
an effective notion of substitutability, i.e. when one
process can be substituted for another, and with it
a range of powerful proof techniques. For this paper
we focus principally on the use of logic to interpret
policy and so move a discussion of bisimulation to an
appendix. The main theorem of the next section re-
lates the logic to bisimulation. The reader unfamiliar
with this important aspect of programming language
semantics is strongly encouraged to look at [22].
3. INTERPRETING CAPABILITIES
Rather than giving a translation of the whole of EC-
MAScript into rho-calculus, we focus on one example
from [6] designed to illustrate key aspects of object-
capabilities and requirements for a policy language.
var makeMint = () => {
var m = WeakMap();
var makePurse = () => mint(0);
var mint = balance => {
var purse = def({
getBalance: () => balance,
makePurse: makePurse,
deposit:
(amount, srcP) => Q(srcP).then(src => {
Nat(balance + amount);
m.get(src)(Nat(amount));
balance += amount;
})
});
var decr = amount => {
balance = Nat(balance - amount);
};
m.set(purse, decr);
return purse;
};
return mint;
};
Interpreting this code illustrates how surprisingly in-
tuitive and natural it is to represent and reason about
object-capabilities in rho-calculus. Essentially, a
capability—i.e. access to some behavior, power or
authority—is represented by a channel. When an agent
in the rho-calculus has access to a channel it has ex-
actly that: access to some behavior, power or author-
ity.
Armed with Cell and Map from the first section, we
can translate each of the language elements from the
bank example into rho-calculus. Note that the inter-
pretation takes a channel k on which to signal com-
pletion of the statement; synchronous JavaScript nec-
essarily needs to be transformed into continuation-
passing style as part of the interpretation in rho-
calculus. The asynchronous Q library used in the def-
inition of the deposit method, on the other hand,
is unneeded because rho-calculus is inherently asyn-
chronous.
[[var x;P ]](x, k) := Cell(x,undefined) | [[P ]](x, k)
[[var x = v;P ]](x, k) :=
new(k1){Cell(x, [[v]](x, k1)) | k1?()⇒ [[P ]](x, k)}
[[P ;Q]](x, k) := new(k1){[[P ]](x, k1) | k1?() => [[Q]](x, k)}
[[i+= a;P ]](x, k) :=
new(k1){
i!get(r)
r?(v)⇒ {i!set(v + [[a]](x, k)) | k1!()}
[[P ]](x, k1)
}
[[def({key1 : state1, . . . , keyn : staten})]](x, k) :=
Map(x, key1, state1, . . . , keyn, staten) | k!()
We do not give an explicit translation of WeakMap be-
cause it is quite large, but it is essentially the same as
Map plus some machinery for performing updates.
The key point is that the translation is compositional,
so we can build up the translation of the whole from
the translation of the parts. Moreover, we can rea-
son equationally in the translated code. For example,
to translate the code fragment below we calculate di-
rectly
[[var balance = initAmt;
balance += amount;P ]](x, k)
= ( defn )
{
Cell(balance, [[initAmt]](x, k))
k!()
new (rslt, k1) {
balance!get(rslt)
rslt?(b)⇒ {
balance!set(b+ [[amount]](x, k))
k1!()
}
k1?()⇒ [[P ]](x, k)
}
}
= ( ex t ru s ion laws f o r new)
new (rslt, k1) {
Cell(balance, [[initAmt]](x, k))
k!()
balance!get(rslt)
rslt?(b)⇒{
balance!set(b+ [[amount]](x, k))
k1!()
}
k1?()⇒ [[P ]](x, k)
}
4. LOGIC
Namespace logic resides in the subfamily of Hennessy-
Milner logics known as spatial logics, discovered by
Caires and Cardelli [3]. Thus, in addition to the action
modalities, we also find at the logical level formulae
for separation corresponding to the structural content
of the parallel operator at the level of the calculus.
Likewise, we have quantification over names. There
are important differences between the logic presented
here and Caires’ logic. The interested reader is re-
ferred to [15].
4.1 Examples
A principal advantage to using logical formulae of this
kind is that they denote classes or programs. Unlike
the usual notion of type, where a type’s inhabitants
are instances of data structures, in namespace logic a
formula (i.e. a type) φ is inhabited by programs—
namely all the programs that satisfy the formulae.
Namespace logic takes this a step further. Because
it is built on a reflective programming language (the
rho-calculus) it also has formulae, pφq, for describing
classes of names. Said another way, the inhabitants
of types of the form pφq are names and hence these
types have the right to be called namespaces. The
next two examples show how useful namespaces are
in the security setting.
4.1.1 Controlling access to namespaces
Suppose that pφq describes some namespace, i.e. some
collection of names. We can insist that a process re-
strict its next input to names in that namespace by
insisting that it witness the formula
〈pφq?b〉 true&¬〈p¬φq?b〉true
which simply says the the process is currently able to
take input from a name in the namespace pφq and is
not capable of input on any name not in that names-
pace. In a similar manner, we can limit a server to
serving only inputs in pφq throughout the lifetime of
its behavior 2
rec X . 〈pφq?b〉X&¬〈p¬φq?b〉X
This formula is reminiscent of the functionality of a
firewall, except that it is a static check. A process
witnessing this formula will behave as though it were
behind a firewall admitting only access to the ports in
2Of course, this formula also says the server never goes
down, either—or at least is always willing to take such
input.
pφq without the need for the additional overhead of
the watchdog machinery.
We will use refinements this basic technique of walling
off a behavior behind a namespace when reasoning
about the ocap examples and especially in the context
of deniability.
φ, ψ ::= true verity
| 0 nullity
| ¬φ negation
| φ&ψ conjunction
| φ | ψ separation
| qbp disclosure
| a!(φ) dissemination
| 〈a?b〉φ reception
| rec X . φ greatest fix point
| ∀n : ψ . φ quantification
a ::= pφq demarcation
| b ...
b ::= pPq nomination
| n ...
We let PForm denote the set of formulae generated
by the φ-production, QForm denote the set of for-
mulae generated by the a-production and V denote
the set of propositional variables used in the rec pro-
duction. Additionally, we let PForm−Par denote the
separation-free fragment of formulae.
Inspired by Caires’ presentation of spatial logic [3], we
give the semantics in terms of sets of processes (and
names). We need the notion of a valuation v : V →
℘(Proc), and use the notation v{S/X} to mean
v{S/X}(Y ) =
{
S Y = X
v(Y ) otherwise
The meaning of formulae is given in terms of two mu-
tually recursive functions,
[[−]](−) : PForm× [V → ℘(Proc)]→ ℘(Proc)
((−))(−) : QForm× [V → ℘(Proc)]→ ℘(@Proc)
taking a formula of the appropriate type and a valua-
tion, and returning a set of processes or a set of names,
respectively.
[[true]](v) := Proc
[[0]](v) := {P : P ≡ 0}
[[¬φ]](v) := Proc/[[φ]](v)
[[φ&ψ]](v) := [[φ]](v) ∩ [[ψ]](v)
[[φ | ψ]](v) :=
{P : ∃P0, P1.P ≡ P0 | P1, P0 ∈ [[φ]](v), P1 ∈ [[ψ]](v)}
[[qbp]](v) := {P : ∃x.P ≡ ∗x, x ∈ ((b))(v)}
[[a!(φ)]](v)
:= {P : ∃P ′.P ≡ x!(P ′), x ∈ ((a))(v), P ′ ∈ [[φ]](v)}
[[〈a?b〉φ]](v) :=
{P : ∃P ′.P ≡ x?(y)⇒ P ′, x ∈ ((a))(v),
∀c.∃z.P ′{z/y} ∈ [[φ{c/b}]](v)}
[[rec X . φ]](v) := ∪{S ⊆ Proc : S ⊆ [[φ]](v{S/X})}
[[∀n : ψ . φ]](v) := ∩x∈((@ψ))(v)[[φ{x/n}]](v)
((pφq))(v) := {x : x≡N @P, P ∈ [[φ]](v)}
((pPq))(v) := {x : x≡N @P}
We say P witnesses φ (resp., x witnesses pφq), written
P |= φ (resp., x |= pφq) just when ∀v.P ∈ [[φ]](v)
(resp., ∀v.x ∈ [[pφq]](v)).
Theorem 4.1.1 (Equivalence). P

≈ Q⇔ ∀φ ∈
PForm−Par.P |= φ⇔ Q |= φ.
The proof employs an adaptation of the standard strat-
egy. A consequence of this theorem is that there is no
algorithm guaranteeing that a check for the witness re-
lation will terminate. However there is a large class of
interesting formulae for which the witness check does
terminate, see [3]. Nota bene: including separation
makes the logic strictly more observant than bismula-
tion.
4.1.2 Syntactic sugar
In the examples below, we freely employ the usual
DeMorgan-based syntactic sugar. For example, φ ⇒
ψ := ¬(φ&¬ψ) and φ ∨ ψ := ¬(¬φ&¬ψ). Also, when
quantification ranges over all of @Proc, as in ∀n :
ptrueq . φ, we omit the typing for the quantification
variable, writing ∀n . φ.
5. INTERPRETING POLICY
Drossopoulou and Noble [6] argue for several differ-
ent types of policy specifications. In this paper we fo-
cus on deniability policies, since the others have ready
translations in this setting. Deniability is the one type
of policy specification where the translation is not at
all straightforward. For the reader familiar with logics
of concurrency the core idea is to use rely-guarantee
combined with the adjunct to spatial separation.
A visual inspection of the code for Cell reveals that if
a process P ’s names are fresh with respect to slot,
then P cannot directly affect any Cell(slot, state).
Unfortunately, visual inspection is not reliable in set-
tings only mildly more complex, as in the bank exam-
ple above; Yee reports that a 90-man-hour review of
around a hundred lines of heavily commented Python
code by security specialists was not sufficient to dis-
cover three inserted bugs [23, Section 7]. However, we
can use our logic to state and verify the fact that P
cannot affect any Cell. Adapting the firewall formula,
let soleAccess(slot) := rec X.〈slot?b〉X&¬〈¬slot?b〉X,
and noAccess(slot) := rec X . ¬〈slot?b〉X; then we
have
Cell(slot, state) |= soleAccess(slot)
which implies
new(slot){Cell(slot, state)}

≈ 0.
If we have that P |= noAccess(slot), then
∀ state.new(slot){P | Cell(slot, state)}

≈ P.
For, by hypothesis, slot cannot be free in P , thus
new(slot){P | Cell(slot, state)}
≡
P | new(slot){Cell(slot, state)}
which means
P | new(slot){Cell(slot, state)}

≈ P | 0≡ P.
More generally, note that objects involve not just one
cell, but many. By restricting those cells to slots that
live in namespace Slot := pφq for some φ we can scale
our formula to separate objects from a given environ-
ment.
For now, we refine the basic idea to illustrate how to
model deniability. The shape of the logical statement
above is: if Q |= φ then when P |= ψ we have that
new(x1, . . . , xN){P | Q}

≈ S for some properties φ
and ψ and some behavior, S. In light of theorem 4.1.1
we can, in principle, transform this into a statement
of the form, “If Q |= φ, then when P |= ψ we have
that new(x1, . . . , xN )P | Q |= ω for some properties
φ, ψ, and ω.” This is the shape of our encoding of
deniability policies. The key insight here is to me-
diate between closed-world and open-world forms of
deniability. In this open-world formulation we do not
quantify over all potential contexts and attackers, but
work just with those that can be relied upon to use
the API, even in attacks.
The first element of this encoding we wish to draw
attention to is that this provides just the emphasis on
necessary rather than sufficient conditions. Moreover,
notice that the form of the statement remains true to
the intent of deniability even if the logic is more dis-
criminating than bisimulation—which is the case if we
include the separation operator (as noted in [3]). In
the presence of a logic with separation this shape turns
out to be a form of rely-guarantee identified by Honda
in [9] and, as Honda observes, can be internalized in
the logic as the adjunct to separation. Thus, we in-
clude a form of rely-guarantee formulae, φ✄~xψ, where
~x = {x1, . . . , xN}, with semantics [[φ ✄~x ψ]](v) = {P :
∀Q.Q ∈ [[φ]](v) ⇒ new(x1, . . . , xN){P |Q} ∈ [[ψ]](v)},
as the logical form that mediates between closed-world
and open-world formulations of deniability.
To apply this to the bank example amounts to rec-
ognizing that the purse is essentially a generalized
Cell. There are two means to access the internal
state: deposit and decr. The example, however,
enjoys an additional level of indirection in that in
the ECMAScript the corresponding functions these are
scoped just to that purse and affect no other. At-
tempting to model this naively will quickly run into
problems, e.g. as a parallel composition of purses will
contend over serving balance update messages. This
is where the higher order nature of the rho-calculus
makes it more suitable than the π-calculus for model-
ing these kinds of programs. In our translation a ref-
erence to purse [[var purse = . . .]] is a Cell that holds
the code of a process for a (generalized) Cell serving
the deposit and decr messages. Updates through a
purse first access and execute the behavior to serve
balance update messages and then put the modified
behavior (with the new balance) back in the Cell for
the purse. Thus, to express the property that no one
can affect the balance of a purse they don’t have [6]
we only have to reason about access through this one
channel, purse, providing access to the outer Cell.
The higher-order nature of the calculus does the rest
of the state management for us. But, we have already
accomplished that for Cells, generically, in our previ-
ous reasoning.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The bulk of our work in modeling deniability policies
as rely-guarantee formulae in a logic with separation
was in setting up the calculi and logic. Once these are
absorbed, the actual model is short and to the point.
We take this as evidence that the approach is natural
and commensurate with the expressiveness demands
of deniability style policies.
In this connection it is important to note that a lot
is already known about the complexity characteristics
of spatial-behavioral logics. Interpreting ocap policy
in this setting, therefore, has the further advantage
that we are able to classify policy statements that are
potentially too hard to check automatically, or even
check at all. To wit, [4] note that the addition of the
adjunct to separation is not a conservative extension!
In developing this approach we uncovered several situ-
ations where value-dependent policies were of interest
or importance. This suggests that some sort of de-
pendent types may be necessary for addressing more
realistic examples.
Finally, source code for implementations of an inter-
preter for the rho-calculus and a model-checker for
namespace logic are available upon request and a more
industrial scale version of the core concepts are used
heavily in the SpecialK library available on github
[17]. This library is already in use in industrial projects
such as the Protunity Business Matching Network [10].
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8. APPENDIX: ρ-CALCULUS SUGAR
It is known that replication (and hence recursion) can
be implemented in a higher-order process algebra [21].
This encoding provides a good example of calculation
with the rho-calculus.
D(x) := x?(y)⇒ (x!(∗y) | ∗y)∫
x
P := x!(D(x) | P ) |D(x)
∫
x
P
=
x!((x?(y)⇒ (x!(∗y) | ∗y)) | P ) | x?(y)⇒ (x!(∗y) | ∗y)
→
(x!(∗y) | ∗y){@(x?(y)⇒ (∗y | x!(∗y))) | P/y}
=
x!(∗@(x?(y)⇒ (x!(∗y) | ∗y)) | P )
| (x?(y)⇒ (x!(∗y) | ∗y)) | P
→
. . .
→∗
P | P | . . .
Of course, this encoding, as an implementation, runs
away, unfolding
∫
x
P eagerly. A lazier and more im-
plementable replication operator, restricted to input-
guarded processes, may be obtained as follows.
∫ x
u?(v)⇒ P := x!(u?(v)⇒ (D(x) | P )) |D(x)
It is worth noting that the combination of reference
and dereference operators is essential to get computa-
tional completeness.
Armed with this we can consider a conservative ex-
tension of the calculus presented above.
P,Q ::= . . .
| (defX(y1, . . . , yN )⇒ P )(Q1, . . . , QN)
| X(Q1, . . . , QN)
| new(x1, . . . , xN)P
The notation for recursive definitions is slightly quirky
in that it simultaneously defines and invokes the def-
inition to some arguments – in order to make the re-
cursive form be a process expression, as opposed to a
separate category of declaration. Comparing this with
the examples above we have simply omitted the appli-
cation of the recursive definitions to initial arguments
in the interest of brevity.
(defX(y1, . . . , yN)⇒ P )(Q1, . . . , QN) :=∫ n(X,P )
(n(X, P )⇒ P ′) | n(X,P )!(Q1, . . . , QN)
where P ′ := P{n(X,P )!(Q1, . . . , QN)/X(Q1, . . . , QN)},
i.e., the body of P in which every occurrence of
X(Q1, . . . , QN)
is replaced with n(X,P )!(Q1, . . . , QN), and n(X,P )
generates a name from X guaranteed fresh in P .
Likewise, there are several translation of the π-calculus
new operator into the rho-calculus. Rather than take
up space in this paper we simply refer the reader to
[16], or better yet, invite them to come up with a def-
inition to test their understanding of the calculus.
Additionally, we call out input-guarded only summa-
tions using the notation
match {
x1?(y1,1, . . . , y1,N )⇒ P1
. . .
xM?(yM,1, . . . , yM,N′)⇒ PM
}
instead of
x1?(y1,1, . . . , y1,N )⇒ P1+. . .+xM?(yM,1, . . . , yM,N′)⇒
PM
In a match context we avail ourselves of a pattern-
matching syntax, such as x?get(ret) ⇒ ret!(v) and
x!get(k). Again, encodings are quite standard, e.g.
see [2].
Finally, we use {. . .} for grouping expressions and
in more complex examples, omit | in favor of line
breaks for legibility. Thus, an expression for a classic
race-condition x?(y1, . . . , yN )⇒ P | x!(Q1, . . . , QN ) |
x?(z1, . . . , zN )⇒ R might be written
{
x?(y1, ..., yN )⇒ P
x!(Q1, ..., QN)
x?(z1, ..., zN)⇒ R
}
9. APPENDIX: BISIMULATION
Having taken the notion of restriction out of the lan-
guage, we carefully place it back into the notion of
observation, and hence into the notion of program
equality, i.e. bisimulation. That is, we parameterize
the notion of barbed bisimulation by a set of names
over which we are allowed to set the barbs. The moti-
vation for this choice is really comparison with other
calculi. The set of names of the rho-calculus is global.
It is impossible, in the grammar of processes, to guard
terms from being placed into contexts that can poten-
tially observe communication, so we provide a place
for reasoning about such limitations on the scope of
observation in the theory of bisimulation.
From an ocap perspective, having the ability to enu-
merate names is usually a sign that a language is not
even memory-safe, let alone capability-safe. However,
in Section 4.1.1 below, we show that we can use types
to create namespaces and then statically prove which
namespaces a process has access to.
Definition 9.0.2. An observation relation, ↓N , over
a set of names, N , is the smallest relation satisfying
the rules below.
y ∈ N , x≡N y
x!(∗v) ↓N x
(Out-barb)
P ↓N x or Q ↓N x
P |Q ↓N x
(Par-barb)
We write P ⇓N x if there is Q such that P ⇒ Q and
Q ↓N x.
Notice that x?(y) ⇒ P has no barb. Indeed, in rho-
calculus as well as other asynchronous calculi, an ob-
server has no direct means to detect if a sent message
has been received or not.
Definition 9.0.3. An N -barbed bisimulation over
a set of names, N , is a symmetric binary relation SN
between agents such that P S NQ implies:
1. If P → P ′ then Q⇒ Q′ and P ′ S NQ
′.
2. If P ↓N x, then Q ⇓N x.
P is N -barbed bisimilar to Q, written P

≈N Q, if
P S NQ for some N -barbed bisimulation SN .
